feat(phase-16): anonymous play & share telemetry substrate (wave 16.1)

Player-service play-session tracker (floor + 3-bucket classify), SharePopover share tracker with debounce, sendBeacon interop, proxied rate-limited POST api/event/{play,share}, append-only event logs + incremental play_counter with server-side release resolution. Migration authored, not applied. No anonId, no read surface.

DeepDrftAPI/Controllers/EventController.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+using DeepDrftData;
+using DeepDrftModels.DTOs;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.RateLimiting;
+
+namespace DeepDrftAPI.Controllers;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Anonymous play/share telemetry intake (Phase 16 §2.2 / §4.3). Unauthenticated — same posture as the
+/// public reads — but IP rate-limited (the "events" limiter, registered in Program.cs) and payload-
+/// validated to make casual inflation annoying (§2.5). Both endpoints return <c>202 Accepted</c>: these
+/// are fire-and-forget telemetry, not transactions, and the client (a <c>sendBeacon</c>) never reads the
+/// response. The release dimension on a play is resolved server-side from the track key (§2.3 / D4).
+/// The controller is a thin HTTP boundary; all write logic lives in <see cref="IEventService"/>.
+/// </summary>
+[ApiController]
+[Route("api/event")]
+[EnableRateLimiting("events")]
+public class EventController : ControllerBase
+{
+    // Reject oversized bodies before deserialization — a coarse abuse guard (§2.5). The legitimate
+    // payloads are a track key + an enum, well under 1 KB.
+    private const int MaxBodyBytes = 1024;
+
+    private readonly IEventService _eventService;
+    private readonly ILogger<EventController> _logger;
+
+    public EventController(IEventService eventService, ILogger<EventController> logger)
+    {
+        _eventService = eventService;
+        _logger = logger;
+    }
+
+    // POST api/event/play (unauthenticated, rate-limited)
+    [HttpPost("play")]
+    [RequestSizeLimit(MaxBodyBytes)]
+    public async Task<ActionResult> RecordPlay([FromBody] PlayEventDto payload, CancellationToken ct = default)
+    {
+        // Reject a missing track key and an out-of-range bucket (§2.5). [ApiController] model binding
+        // already 400s a malformed/oversized body and an undefined enum value, but the explicit guards
+        // keep the contract obvious and cover the empty-string key the model binder lets through.
+        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(payload.TrackEntryKey))
+            return BadRequest("trackEntryKey is required");
+        if (!Enum.IsDefined(payload.Bucket))
+            return BadRequest("bucket is invalid");
+
+        // Wave 16.1 writes no anonId — defend the substrate by dropping any the client sends early.
+        var result = await _eventService.RecordPlay(payload.TrackEntryKey, payload.Bucket, anonId: null, ct);
+        if (!result.Success)
+        {
+            // A telemetry failure must never surface to the listener as an error they can act on, but
+            // we still log it and answer 5xx so a monitor can see the substrate is unhealthy. The
+            // beacon ignores the status either way.
+            _logger.LogWarning("RecordPlay failed: {Error}", result.Messages.FirstOrDefault()?.Message);
+            return StatusCode(500);
+        }
+
+        return Accepted();
+    }
+
+    // POST api/event/share (unauthenticated, rate-limited)
+    [HttpPost("share")]
+    [RequestSizeLimit(MaxBodyBytes)]
+    public async Task<ActionResult> RecordShare([FromBody] ShareEventDto payload, CancellationToken ct = default)
+    {
+        if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(payload.TargetKey))
+            return BadRequest("targetKey is required");
+        if (!Enum.IsDefined(payload.TargetType))
+            return BadRequest("targetType is invalid");
+        if (!Enum.IsDefined(payload.Channel))
+            return BadRequest("channel is invalid");
+
+        var result = await _eventService.RecordShare(payload.TargetType, payload.TargetKey, payload.Channel, anonId: null, ct);
+        if (!result.Success)
+        {
+            _logger.LogWarning("RecordShare failed: {Error}", result.Messages.FirstOrDefault()?.Message);
+            return StatusCode(500);
+        }
+
+        return Accepted();
+    }
+}

DeepDrftAPI/Program.cs

@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ using DeepDrftData;
 using DeepDrftData.Data;
 using DeepDrftData.Repositories;
 using Microsoft.AspNetCore.HttpOverrides;
+using Microsoft.AspNetCore.RateLimiting;
 using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
 using NetBlocks.Utilities.Environment;
+using System.Threading.RateLimiting;
 
 // Required credential files — must exist before the app will start.
 // Production secrets stay gitignored; the *.example.json templates at the project root show the shape.
@@ -64,6 +66,14 @@ builder.Services
     .AddScoped<ITrackService>(sp => sp.GetRequiredService<TrackManager>());
 builder.Services.AddScoped<UnifiedTrackService>();
 
+// Phase 16 anonymous telemetry — append-only event logs + incremental play-counter rollup (all SQL).
+// EventManager is the IEventService boundary; EventRepository owns the EF writes and the
+// release-resolution + counter-bump transaction.
+builder.Services
+    .AddScoped<EventRepository>()
+    .AddScoped<EventManager>()
+    .AddScoped<IEventService>(sp => sp.GetRequiredService<EventManager>());
+
 // Release domain — medium-aware read projection + satellite metadata writes. ReleaseManager is the
 // IReleaseService implementation; UnifiedReleaseService orchestrates the vault + SQL satellite writes.
 builder.Services
@@ -118,6 +128,25 @@ builder.Services.Configure<ForwardedHeadersOptions>(options =>
     options.KnownProxies.Clear();
 });
 
+// Per-IP rate limiting for the anonymous telemetry intake (Phase 16 §2.5). Coarse and stateless —
+// a fixed window keyed by the (forwarded) remote IP. The substrate sits behind nginx, so the real
+// client IP is the X-Forwarded-For value UseForwardedHeaders resolves into Connection.RemoteIpAddress.
+// On limit, reject with 429 (the beacon ignores it; this only blunts casual inflation). The 30-window
+// budget is generous for a real listening session and only bites on scripted spam.
+builder.Services.AddRateLimiter(options =>
+{
+    options.RejectionStatusCode = StatusCodes.Status429TooManyRequests;
+    options.AddPolicy("events", httpContext =>
+        RateLimitPartition.GetFixedWindowLimiter(
+            partitionKey: httpContext.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString() ?? "unknown",
+            factory: _ => new FixedWindowRateLimiterOptions
+            {
+                PermitLimit = 30,
+                Window = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(1),
+                QueueLimit = 0,
+            }));
+});
+
 var app = builder.Build();
 
 // Apply AuthBlocks EF migrations, seed system roles, seed admin user on first boot.
@@ -136,6 +165,11 @@ if (app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
 
 app.UseCors("ContentApiPolicy");
 
+// Rate limiter must sit in the pipeline for the [EnableRateLimiting("events")] attribute on
+// EventController to take effect. Only the telemetry endpoints carry the policy; everything else is
+// unaffected (no global limiter is set).
+app.UseRateLimiter();
+
 // ApiKey middleware only enforces on endpoints tagged [ApiKeyAuthorize] (the track surface); it
 // passes all other endpoints through. JWT auth/authorization gate the AuthBlocks endpoints, which
 // carry no [ApiKeyAuthorize] metadata — the two schemes are orthogonal and do not interfere.